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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MISSOURI'S CHILD SUPPORT LAWS
INTRODUCTION
Nearly eighteen months had passed since Tina Dawson filed the petition
necessary to end her marriage. Finally the ordeal was over-or so she
thought. The court had granted a dissolution of marriage and, along with
it, a child support order of $600 per month. The court order had resolved
all disagreements about custody, visitation, and child support. Six months
later, however, Tina was back where she began. This mother of two small
children had received only $300 since initially bringing the dissolution of
marriage action. She felt helpless and betrayed.
Yet, custodial parents are not the only ones who fall prey to "the
system." Noncustodial parents may also be victims. For example, Don
Riley had made every monthly child support payment for the full amount.
But, more times than not, when he arrived to pick up his young son, as
part of the court-ordered visitation agreement, he found nothing but an
empty house. Don, too, felt the system had let him down.
Situations like these,1 coupled with alarming divorce statistics,2 prompted
1. See T. ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, EcoNoMcs AND SOCIAL
DILEmiSAs (1986) (interviews with divorced mothers in anecdotal form).
2. With more than one million couples divorcing each year, some 500,000
children are dependent on support from a noncustodial parent. J. LiBEmRmAN,
CILD SUPPORT IN AVmRICA 8 (1986). "In the first year following divorce, ...
men's standard of living rises an average 42% ... [while] for women and their
children it drops a sickening 73%." The Myth of Equality, 73 WOMEN LAW. J.
14 (1987). Of the fifteen million children who live in households headed by mothers,
only 35 percent of the custodial mothers receive child support with the result being
that almost one-third of the families live in poverty. L. WErrzMAN, Tn DIVORCE
REVOLUTION 263 (1985). "There is a mountain of information on family disinte-
gration, the divorce rate, separations and desertions .... What the statisticians
don't report is the number of unhappy and heartbroken men who are sitting alone
in a furnished room somewhere with nothing from the past but their clothing."
G. SILVER AND M. SILVER, WEEKEND FATHERS 6 (1986). "The statistics don't talk
of the poverty level many men are subjected to after paying exorbitant alimony
and child support so the kids 'won't have to have their lives disrupted'....
Statisticians are able to quantify how deprived and exploited women are, but they
haven't reduced the abuse inflicted on men to numbers yet." Id. A survey of
nearly 1500 children of divorced parents revealed that 52 percent of the children
had not been contacted by their fathers during the previous year, and 35.5 percent
had experienced no communication with their fathers in the past five years. T.
ARENDELL, supra note 1, at 110.
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both Congress' and state legislatures4 to enact statutes providing for the
3. Traditionally, family law has been left to the discretion of the individual
states. However, in 1935 the federal government became marginally involved when
it created the Aid to' Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program as part
of the Social Security Act. Although AFDC was originally intended primarily to
assist relatives of dependent children whose parents had died, the needs were such
that the program was actually used more often to assist children whose fathers
had deserted them and refused to pay support. J. LEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 5.
The next major federal intervention into what had formerly been the states'
domain came in the early 1970's and was prompted in part by the fact that the
cost of the AFDC program had escalated to $7.6 billion a year and in part by a
study which indicated that "state ... agencies were casual at best in trying to
collect child support from the fathers of [AFDC children]." Id. at 6. These factors,
combined with growing public frustration with the welfare system, resulted in
passage of the Child Support and Establishment of Paternity Act of 1974. Id. at
6-7. Aimed at cutting welfare costs by pressuring states to pursue delinquent fathers,
the act also contained "an unusually farsighted provision" through which non-
AFDC parents could make use of the collection services for a small fee. Id. at 7.
The rationale behind the additional provision was that parents who did not receive
support from absent parents would eventually join the ranks of AFDC parents,
at a price much higher to taxpayers than that of access to collection services. Id.
In what has been termed "the most important change" in the area of child
support law since the 1974 enactment, Congressional legislation passed in 1984
provided for automatic wage deductions for any parent who is 30 days delinquent
in support payments, expedited processing of child support cases, and the estab-
lishment of state guidelines for those responsible for fixing support decrees. Id. at
9-10.
Recently enacted legislation expected to have great impact on domestic re-
lations law is the Family Support Act of 1988, which requires that states make
their child support guidelines rebuttable presumptions. See Family Support Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343.
4. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.150(d) (1988) (court in making custody
decision may consider only those factors directly affecting child's well-being); CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5) (1987) (standard for custody award is what is "ad-
vantageous to the child and in his best interests"); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-129.5
(1987) (parent violating visitation order or support order may be required to post
bond to insure future compliance; party whose visitation rights are violated may
seek tort remedy); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(B)(vi) (1988) (in awarding custody,
court shall consider "willingness and ability of each parent to respect and appreciate
the bond between the child and the other parent and to allow for a continuing
relationship between the child and the other parent"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(a)(1) (1988) (allows for the increasing of child support obligation to beyond
age of eighteen provided child is completing high school-duty, in such cases,
terminates on June 1 of school year in which child attains age eighteen); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(e)-(f) (1988) (repeated unreasonable visitation interference or
repeated child support misuse may be considered material change of circumstances
justifying modification of custody); see also Freed & Walker, Family Law in the
Fifty States: An Overview, 21 F. L.Q. 417, 515 (1988) (suggesting Kansas may
be the only state with this type of child support misuse provision); Onio REv.
CODE ANN. § 3113.21(F)(1) (Anderson 1989) (providing that support garnishments
have priority over creditor garnishments); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224(1) (1989)
(joint custody as representing the child's best interest is presumed and courts need
only explain the reasoning behind an award if joint custody is denied): 2
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dissolution of marriage and the accompanying issues relating to children.
The Missouri legislature responded to the problems raised in domestic
relations litigation by approving House Bill 1272 on June 20, 1988. The
new legislation encompasses sweeping changes, particularly in the areas of
child custody and support.5
Although the legislation was directed at resolving critical domestic
relations issues, some authorities question whether the legislation will achieve
its goal.6 They believe the highly emotional and personal nature of the
issues addressed in the statute necessarily made it difficult for legislators
to view the subject matter objectively. Namely, the biases and prejudices
inherently a part of this type of legislation may actually result in the
creation of-rather than solutions to-domestic relations problems.7
Practitioners and legal scholars are especially critical of the new leg-
islative provisions concerning child support. This Note will focus first on
the provisions that deal with termination of child support (emancipation).
Second, it will evaluate that part of the legislation that requires accounting
for the manner in which child support payments are spent. Then it will
assess the provision that conditions payments of child support on compliance
with court-ordered visitation. Finally, this Note will analyze the ramifications
of the legislation and propose alternatives to some of its perceived short-
comings.
EMANCIPATION
The term "emancipation" is used to describe "[a] release which sets
the child free from legal subjection and gives [him or her] the right ...
[to] collect and control [his or her] own wages." 8 Although a child is
5. Changes in the area of child support include providing that the obligations
are to be retroactive to the time the divorce petition was filed. Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 452.340 (Supp. 1988). The legislation appears to create a change in the approach
to awarding custody with joint custody prevailing as the preferred arrangement.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375(A) (Supp. 1988) (same language was retained in 1989
Mo. Legis. Serv. 107 (Vernon) (approved July 5, 1989) which replaces Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 452.375). Although some authorities have suggested that a presumption of
joint custody will lead to greater compliance with child support orders, at least
one study of the relationship between custody and support does not support this
contention. Polikoff, Custody and Visitation: Their Relationship to Establishing
and Enforcing Support, in 2 IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE., 111-131 (1986).
Of particular concern is the fact that the imposition of joint custody is often used
as a means of "inappropriately reduc[ing] support awards." Id. at 111-132.
6. Fields, Numerous Problems Cited in Child Support Sections of Family
Law Measure, Mo. Law. Weekly, June 27, 1988, at 4, col. 4.
7. The legislation has been described as "start[ing] out as perfectly decent
... [until] every person ... stuck his or her legislative finger in it, remembering
what happened to cousin George or Aunt Mary and trying to make sure it [didn't]
happen again." Id. at 4, cols. 5-6.
8. 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 80 (1987).
1989] 1103
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normally said to be emancipated automatically upon reaching the age of
majority, the term is used more commonly to describe a status attained
while still legally a minor. 9 The status results from both the acts and
omissions of a parent, as well as the acts of the child.' 0
Although varying degrees of emancipation exist, complete emancipation
results only when a parent relinquishes all legal rights and duties pursuant
to the parent-child relationship." Courts, generally, have held that complete
emancipation:
1. relinquishes the parental right to a child's services;
2. affords the child the right to hold a job and spend
any earnings; and
3. terminates the parent's duty of care and support.' 2
As previously noted, a child is emancipated automatically upon attaining
the age of majority. Prior to the enactment of House Bill 1272, Missouri
case law held that the age of majority was twenty-one. 3 Missouri cases
also held that parents had an obligation to support their children until
they reached majority or were otherwise emancipated.' 4 The new legislation
dramatically changes the circumstances that end the parent's duty to support
a child. The duty to support may end when the child dies, marries, enters
the military, or becomes self-supporting. 5 The new legislation also lowers





13. Biermann v. Biermann, 657 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
14. Id.; Barks v. Barks, 686 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
15. The statute provides:
Unless the circumstances of the child manifestly dictate otherwise and the
court specifically so provides, the obligation of a parent to make child
support payments shall terminate when the child:
(1) Dies;
(2) Marries;
(3) Enters active duty in the military;
(4) Becomes self-supporting, provided that the custodial parent has
relinquished the child from parental control by express or implied consent;
or
(5) Reaches age eighteen or graduates from a secondary school, which-
ever later occurs, unless the provisions of subsection 4 or 5 of this section
apply.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340.3 (Supp. 1988).
Historically, under Missouri case law, the emancipation of a child may come
about in three ways: first, by express parental consent; second, by implied parental
consent; and third, by undergoing a "change of status in the eyes of society,"
such as entering military service or marrying. Orth v. Orth, 637 S.W.2d 201, 205
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
For emancipation to occur by express or implied parental consent, the child
1104 [Vol. 54
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/10
MISSOURI CHILD SUPPORT LAWS
Other provisions of the statute identify situations in which the duty
to support a child continues past the age of majority. Physical or mental
incapacitation could require continued support.17 Additionally, subsection
5 provides that "[i]f the child is attending an institution of vocational or
higher education, the parental support obligation shall continue until the
child completes his education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-
two, whichever first occurs."' 8
Subsection 5 is unclear. First, the legislature did not define the term
"attending" with regard to education. This leaves the courts to determine
what constitutes "attending" under provision 5 of section 452.340.19
Missouri courts have held that the words used in a statute should be
construed according to their "plain and ordinary meaning." ' 20 Furthermore,
courts should construe statutory provisions based on common usage unless
such construction "produces an absurd result or ... defeats the purpose
for which the Act was passed."'" To the extent that a statute is "plain,
simple and straightforward, words must be accorded their normal meanings,
and it is appropriate to assume the ordinary meaning of those words
accurately expresses legislative purpose. ' 22
The ordinary meaning of "attend" as defined in standard dictionaries
is "to be present."' ' In this context, a dictionary definition is not useful
in interpreting the new legislation. Because of the difficulty in determining
what constitutes "attending" and the absence of a definition in the statute,
a court could declare the provision ambiguous. Missouri courts, in deter-
must be old enough to "take care of and provide for himself." Id. In making a
determination that the child has been emancipated by implied consent, courts have
considered whether the child is regularly employed, has sufficient income to be
self-supporting, and spends the money earned in the manner he chooses. Id.
16. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340.3(5) (Supp. 1988).
17. Subsection 4 provides that "[i]f the child is physically or mentally
incapacitated from supporting himself and insolvent and unmarried, the court may
extend the parental support obligation past the child's eighteenth birthday." Id. §
452.340.4.
18. Id. § 452.340.5 (Supp. 1988). Missouri case law has long considered
college expenses relevant in setting child support amounts. Although a college
education is not a birthright, the opportunity to obtain a post-secondary degree
at an institution of the caliber the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
been successful is a factor to consider in determining the amount of child support
payments. See Roberts v. Roberts, 592 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
19. See Bartlett & Co. Grain v. Director of Revenue, 649 S.W.2d 220 (Mo.
1983) (stating paramount rule of statutory construction is determining legislative
intent).
20. State v. Patterson, 729 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
21. Steinberg Dredging Co. v. Walling, 158 F.2d 678, 681 (8th Cir. 1947).
22. United States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted).
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mining whether statutory language is ambiguous, consider whether the terms
used are "plain and clear to a person of ordinary intelligence." 2 4 "At-
tending" may mean enrollment in one class or it may mean a full-time
classload. Practitioners have indicated that such differing interpretations
may result in judicial determinations that the language is ambiguous. 25
Should the courts agree with these practitioners, they will be unable
to rely on the ordinary meaning rule. Instead, courts may look to "the
evil [the statute] seeks to remedy and ... the circumstances and conditions
existing at the time of its enactment" in effectuating the legislature's intent.2 6
To date, no Missouri case has interpreted what "attending" means in
the context of the new provision. Cases decided prior to the legislative
enactment which have dealt with similar issues may offer insight on how
broadly courts may interpret this provision.
In a decision made when the age of majority was twenty-one, the
Missouri Court of Appeals in Orth v. Orth27 upheld the trial court's decision
that a twenty-year-old daughter was not emancipated. Since the age of 19,
the daughter, except for a brief two-month period, had lived out of state
with her boyfriend.u Prior to moving out of state, the daughter had lived
on campus while attending a college in St. Louis.29 After moving, she
attended a community college night school.30
In making its determination that the daughter was not emancipated,
the trial court appeared to rely on its finding that the daughter was not
self-supporting. 31 Upholding the lower court's decision, the appellate court
noted that the father, who was seeking to terminate child support on the
basis of emancipation, had testified that he continued to send her money
after she moved out of her mother's home. He stated that she was ex-
24. Alheim v. Mullendore, 714 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
25. Fields, supra note 6, at 4. Other means exist for clarifying statutory
language; i.e., promulgating regulations. For example, continued state-supported
payment for higher education expenses have been conditioned upon the student's
fulfilling certain requirements. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the legislation
which created the Missouri Guaranteed Student Loan Program indicate a recipient
must be a "full time student." Mo. CODE REGs. tit. 6, § 10-2.020 (1988). "Full-
time student means a student who is enrolled in at least twelve (12) semester hours."
Id. The regulations provide that the recipient must be making satisfactory academic
progress. Id. "Satisfactory academic progress means that a student is successfully
completing sufficient courses in his/her course of study to secure the certification
or degree toward which he/she is working in no more than the number of semesters
... normally required by the institution in which the student is enrolled .... "
Id.
26. Mashak v. Poelker, 367 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Mo. 1963).
27. 637 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
28. Id. at 205.
29. Id. at 204.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 205.
6
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periencing a "hard time getting on her feet financially. ' a2 The appellate
court further noted that the record in no way indicated that the daughter's
circumstances had changed. No evidence was presented that she "got on
her feet" during the time in question. 3  Neither court discussed whether
attendance of college classes affected the finding that she was not eman-
cipated.
In another ruling made under the former legislation which extended
the duty to support until age twenty-one, the court in In re Marriage of
Hughes3 4 addressed related issues. The court determined that conditioning
the duty to support on a child's attending a "publicly supported" and
"fully accredited" college on a "full time" basis would be difficult to
enforce.35 The court also indicated that a dissolution provision of this nature
"is not sufficiently definite to be capable of enforcement" without an
evidentiary hearing.3 6 Based on this case, the rather ambiguous wording
of the new legislation makes it ripe for litigation.
Another problem in determining what constitutes "attendance" is how
to treat children who drop out of college briefly with the intention of
completing the degree at a later date.37 There is uncertainty whether child
support should be terminated and, if so, whether the same court will retain
jurisdiction to allow for reinstatement of the child support order if the
child starts attending college again. 38 One basis for arguing that the court
retains jurisdiction is section 452.370 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
Section 452.370 provides that "[t]he circuit court shall have continuing
personal jurisdiction over both the obligee and the obligor of a court order
for child support . .. for the purpose of modifying such order." 9
If the legislative intent supporting section 452.370 was to promote
parental financial assistance to those children pursuing advanced training,
an amendment is needed. The amendment should include a "good cause
drop out provision" to enable a court to make allowances on a case-by-
case basis. The following model suggests how a court could phrase an
amendment:
In the event a child must drop out of the institution of higher learning
due to the time and/or financial constraints imposed by illness, family
emergencies, lack of resources, or any other reasonable justification as
determined by the circuit court retaining jurisdiction, the child or other
interested party may petition the court to reinstate the child support order.
If the court determines that the order should be reinstated, the statute is
32. Id. at 204-05.
33. Id. at 205.
34. In re Marriage of Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
35. Id. at 282.
36. Id.
37. Fields, supra note 6, at 4.
38. Id.
39. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 452.370 (1988).
19891 1107
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tolled during the drop out period with the practical effect that the number
of months which pass during the tolled period will be added to the
reinstatement period's duration.
A third problem is raised by the provision that support continues "until
the child completes his education, or until the child reaches the age of
twenty-two, whichever first occurs."'4' Recognizing that many college stu-
dents turn twenty-two sometime during their fourth year of undergraduate
college, the legislature might have avoided some problems by terminating
support at age twenty-three rather than twenty-two. Since the statute's
language provides for either completion of the education or attainment of
age twenty-two-whichever comes first-individuals with late spring or
summer birthdays will be able to complete a traditional four-year college
program before the support is terminated. According to a strict reading
of the statute, individuals with early birthdays presumably will not have
the same opportunity. 41 Further complications could occur when one child
has a late birthday and another child has an early birthday. The statute
would preclude the one child from receiving the support necessary to
complete his or her education. To the extent the introductory language of
subsection 3(5), "[u]nless the circumstances of the child manifestly dictate
otherwise and the court specifically so provides, the obligation of a parent
... shall terminate when the child: Reaches age eighteen or graduates from
a secondary school, whichever later occurs, unless ... subsection ... 5
of this section [applies]" 42 may be read in conjunction with subsection 5,
courts may find that the support should not be terminated until the parent
has afforded each child in a particular family the same educational op-
portunities. If the courts determine that this proposed construction was
not the legislature's intent, it is possible that one child will not get the
same opportunities afforded another sibling. Arguably, approximately the
same amount of money will be paid, yet there is an inherent inequity that
some children in a family will graduate without the burden of a debt
whereas their less fortunate siblings may be forced to incur additional debt
in order to complete their degrees. Amending this statute to provide that
the support obligation continues "until either completion of the education
or attaining age twenty-three-whichever comes first" would eliminate many
of the problems posed by the age twenty-two cut-off. Another way to
alleviate these types of situations is to amend the statute by adding the
following provision:
when justice and fairness so require, nothing in this act shall prohibit any
court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent
person beyond the age of 18 years.4 3
40. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 452.340 (1988).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340 (Supp. 1988).
42. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340.3 (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
43. See FLA. STAT. § 743.07(2) (1989).
[Vol. 541108
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The court in Nicolay v. Nicolay" addressed a similarly worded Florida
statute. Nicolay stated in dicta that it "would be inclined to hold that in
a dissolution proceeding a court could find a child under the age of twenty-
one dependent by reason of attendance at college and order one or both
of his parents to provide support. ' 45 The court elaborated on its choice
of 21 as the "cut-off" age:
One might reasonably ask why a court could not order support for college
beyond the age of twenty-one since that age no longer has any statutory
significance. The answer, we submit, is that while the legislature in lowering
the age of majority to eighteen did not intend to eliminate any requirement
for parents to pay their children's way through college, there is nothing
to indicate that the legislature wished to enlarge parental obligations.46
Fewer than five years after the Florida Court of Appeals' decision in
Nicolay, the Florida Supreme Court in Grapin v. Grapin47 disapproved the
Nicolay decision. The Grapin court stated that parents do not have a legal
duty to support the educational pursuits of a child who has reached
majority. 48 The court noted that
[w]hile most parents willingly assist their adult children in obtaining a
higher education that is increasingly necessary in today's fast-changing
world, any duty to do so is a moral rather than a legal one. Parents who
remain married while their children attend college may continue supporting
their children even beyond [the age of majority] .... but such support
may be conditional or may be withdrawn at any time, and no one may
bring an action to enforce continued payments. It would be fundamentally
unfair for courts to enforce these moral obligations of support only against
divorced parents while other parents may do as they choose. 49
Courts in other states, however, refute this equal protection challenge.
The Washington Supreme Court in Childers v. Childers0 stated that trial
courts have discretion to order post-majority educational support. In Child-
ers, the court noted the "irremediable disadvantages" of children whose
parents have divorced and emphasized the state's legitimate interest in
minimizing such disadvantages. 1 In upholding the Washington statute pro-
viding for post-majority support, the court stated that the statute bore a
rational relationship to the state's interest in producing a "well-educated
citizenry capable of making the intelligent decisions required in a democratic
society."5 2
44. 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1980).
45. Id. at 505.
46. Id. at 505-06 n.5.
47. 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984).
48. Id. at 854.
49. Id.
50. 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (en banc).
51. Id. at 604, 575 P.2d at 208.
52. Id., 575 P.2d at 208-09.
1989] 1109
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The Iowa Supreme Court refuted a similar equal protection challenge
in In re Marriage of Vrban.13 The court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute which allowed continued financial support for full-time post-sec-
ondary students who were between the age of eighteen and twenty-two. 54
The court noted the state's interest in promoting higher education and
found the statute rationally related to that interest.5" The court also pointed
out that the legislature, by enacting the statute, may have relied on the
fact that parents who remain married are more likely to work together to
provide post-majority educational support for their children. Hence, the
legislature probably felt it unnecessary to interfere in such circumstances.56
Should Missouri courts interpret the legislation to allow support to
continue past the age of twenty-two, authority exists for both sides of an
equal protection challenge. Given that the legislature clearly has indicated
its intent to promote parental support of post-secondary education, Missouri
courts will likely follow those states whose courts have refuted equal
protection challenges on the basis of the state's interest in producing a
well-educated citizenry.
Recognizing some of the problems with the legislation as originally
enacted, the 85th General Assembly in its First Extraordinary Session of
1989 attempted to clarify some of the ambiguities of the original act. The
statute now provides:
If the child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education
not later than October first following graduation from a secondary school
and so long as the child continues to attend such institution of vocational
or higher education, the parental support obligation shall continue until
the child completes his education, or until the child reaches the age of
twenty-two, whichever first occurs.5 7
Thus, the legislature has attempted to formulate some time guidelines during
which a child may anticipate support payments which will provide financial
assistance for a post-secondary education. Interpretation of this language
is a matter for the Missouri courts as they attempt to reconcile it with
language indicating that child support payments will terminate on certain
conditions "[u]nless the circumstances of the child manifestly dictate oth-
erwise and the court specifically so provides."58
Further attempting to clarify the original legislation, the General As-
sembly added definitions for the terms "institution of vocational education"
and "higher education." "Institution of vocational education" is defined
53. 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980).
54. IowA CODE § 598.1(2) (1989).
55. 293 N.W.2d at 202.
56. Id.
57. Act of July 27, 1989, § 452.340.5, 1989 Mo. Laws 1242 (effective July
27, 1989).
58. Id. § 452.340.3.
1110 [Vol. 54
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as "any post-secondary training or schooling for which the student is
assessed a fee and attends classes regularly."5 9 "Higher education" is defined
as "any junior college, college, or university at which the child attends
classes regularly." 60 Although still not addressing whether a child must be
a full-time student in order to benefit from this extended period of child
support, the legislature may be indicating by its use of the plural "classes"
that merely taking one class will not qualify a child for further payments.
ACCOUNTING
A second provision of House Bill 1272 prompting concern is the court-
ordered "accounting" which may be made pursuant to the noncustodial
parent's request. The statute provides:
The court which issued a judgment or order of child support payments
may, upon petition of the party obligated to make the payments and upon
good cause shown, order the custodial parent to furnish the party having
the support obligation with a regular summary of expenses paid by the
custodial parent on behalf of the child. The court may prescribe the form
and substance of the summary.6'
The motivation behind this accounting provision is a belief shared by many
that the money noncustodial parents pay toward child support is frequently
expended on items and activities unrelated to the child. 2
In Weekend Fathers, a book dedicated "[tlo all fathers who are kept
from sharing in the joy and pain of raising their own children, ' 63 the
authors found that
[o]ne of the most common complaints of responsible fathers who pay
child support is that there is no accounting of how the money is spent.
Indeed, there are women who receive substantial child support which is
spent on their own personal needs rather than on the children. Some
women view child support as an extension of their alimony."
These same authors also indicated that "[clourts should require that the
recipient of child support give a full and complete accounting of how the
money is spent." 6
Although the statute requires a "regular summary" it fails to define
either term. This ambiguity requires a similar analysis as is required with
the "attending an institution" provision.6 6 A further complication, however,
59. Id. § 452.340.5.
60. Id.
61. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.342 (Supp. 1988).
62. G. SILVER & M. SILVER, WEEKEND FATmRS 117-18 (1986).
63. Id. at vii.
64. Id. at 117-18 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
66. See supra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
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is that although the legislature did not expressly use the term "accounting,"
the language implies such a procedure.
Following the "plain and ordinary meaning" rule, 67 a court could order
a regular summary or accounting consisting of "a detailed report of the
financial state or transactions of [the custodial parent] ."68 If courts de-
termine that the legislature's intent was to provide for an accounting in
the "legal sense," they could order the "rendition of an account." '69 The
"account" could consist of any one of the following standards:
A detailed statement of the mutual demands in the nature of debit and
credit between parties, arising out of ... some fiduciary relation. A
statement in writing, of debts and credits, or of receipts and payments;
a list of items of debts and credits, with their respective dates ... a
record course of business dealing between parties."70
To date, no Missouri court has interpreted the meaning of the term
"regular summary" pursuant to the new legislation. Missouri courts will
find little direction from the law of other states. As of this writing, it
appears no other state legislature has provided for an "accounting" pursuant
to a child support order.
In prior cases unrelated to domestic relations litigation, Missouri courts
have indicated that "fa]n accounting is an equitable remedy ... appropriate
where there are many items to be settled and adjusted between parties."'7
Missouri courts have also indicated that an accounting is based upon the
"need of discovery, . . . the complicated nature of the accounts, . . . the
existence of a fiduciary or trust relationship, and ... the inadequacy of
legal remedy." 7 2 Courts will have to decide whether this is what the
legislature envisioned when it provided for a "regular summary."
Another weakness with this provision is the lack of guidance concerning
factors to consider in determining whether "good cause" exists.73 In clear
situations, "good cause" will be obvious; for example, evidence that the
child's "necessaries" are not being provided yet the custodial parent va-
cations in exotic places.7 4 The difficult situation arises in determining what
lesser incidents constitute "good cause." Once again, the courts will make
such a determination based on the specific facts of each case.
67. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
68. Tm RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 13 (2d ed.
1983).
69. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 18 (5th ed. 1979).
70. Id. at 17.
71. Willett v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 2, 602 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
72. Kalberloh v. Stewart, 378 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (citation
omitted).
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
74. See Cole v. Estate of Armstrong, 707 S.W.2d 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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As indicated previously, the statute does not specify a "regular sum-
mary" format.75 The legislature has left the format choice to the discretion
of individual courts. 76 The statute offers no guidance regarding how detailed
the accounting must be, nor what evidence will satisfy a court that the
custodial parent is making reasonable expenditures for the child. Since the
legislation leaves decisions concerning the accounting entirely in the courts'
hands, practitioners will likely see a wide variety of required formats.
The statute does not provide guidance regarding the frequency of the
accounting. An accounting once a month-an arrangement which would
coincide with the customary monthly support payments-is sensible.
Since the statute is silent concerning the time period relating to an
accounting, the decision on how far back the accounting is to extend would
be in the court's discretion. Problems could arise if the judge ordered the
accounting to cover periods in the distant past and also required proof
other than the custodial parent's sworn statement. Such an order could be
burdensome, particularly if the custodial parent is in the habit of paying
for items in cash and not keeping receipts. Amending the statute to include
time limits would assure that the provision is actually used to help children
and not used to harass custodial parents. Even if the parent pays by check
or credit card, the accounting could become burdensome if a judge insists
upon receipts to show that a particular purchase was indeed children's
clothing or supplies needed for a school project. The legislature could
alleviate this problem by amending the statute to provide that a court may
not order a retrospective accounting; meaning, the accounting period could
not begin until the custodial parent received actual notice of the format
and proof required by the court. Noncustodial parents who have reason
to believe that support money will be spent unwisely from the outset could
incorporate some type of accounting provision into the original dissolution
decree.
Yet another problem is ascertaining how long the duty to provide a
"regular summary" should continue. Although this decision is also left to
the court's discretion, continuing beyond a period needed to establish proper
use of child support payments would serve no purpose and would unduly
burden the "accounting" parent.
Conscientious custodial parents receiving regular payments, however,
should have little difficulty in establishing that the child support payments
are spent on the child. Equitable considerations suggest that a noncustodial
parent with "unclean hands" could not obtain a court-ordered "regular
summary." Given that national figures suggest noncustodial parents owe
between four to five billion dollars in unpaid child support,7 7 this provision
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.342 (1988).
76. Id.
77. B. CLAm & A. DANmiLE, THE Ex-FACTOR 19 (1986).
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and the concerns it raises could amount to "much ado about nothing."
Conscientious custodial parents should harbor no fears if faced with
an order for an accounting. For a custodial parent with small children
requiring daycare, the high costs of that care will demonstrate a reasonable
use of child support. 78 For example, the cost for one infant at a private
daycare center in the greater Kansas City area is about $100 per week. 79
Individuals usually charge substantially lower rates but with the large number
of women pursuing their own careers, such "neighborhood sitters" are
scarce.80 Determining the amount the custodial parent could report pursuant
to the accounting would be left to the court's discretion. Thus, the question
arises as to whether the full amount could be reported, half could be
reported (representing an equal split of the parents' shares), or a fractional
portion could be reported (based on a formula taking into account both
parents' incomes). Similar issues would arise in determining the portion of
rent/house payments, car payment, utility bills, and insurance to be credited
in this accounting process. Some portion of these bills would be reasonable
expenses for the child. Again, the amount allowed would presumably be
some fractional portion based upon the ability of both parents to provide
for the child and the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had
the marriage not ended.8"
An issue tangential to this provision is how a court would assess
expenses for purposes of this accounting if the court awards joint custody.82
This concern could take on greater significance because recent legislation
appears to favor joint custody.83 Although the statutory language is am-
biguous, a strong policy statement suggests that a court should consider
joint custody as the preferable arrangement.
Additional problems with the accounting provision include the statute's
failure to identify the person or entity entitled to evaluate the accounting
and what the consequences are when the custodial parent does not provide
the "regular summary" as ordered by the court.A4 One obvious remedy
for failing to comply with the court order would be holding the custodial
parent in contempt. The statute is also silent concerning measures if the
noncustodial parent believes the accounting demonstrates frivolous expen-
ditures or use of child support money for expenses other than those of
the child.85
78. Interview with Kamala Simmons, parent of infant (Dec. 28, 1988).
79. Id.
80. Id.; interview with Tammy Darling, parent of pre-school aged children
(Dec. 28, 1988).
81. See Freed & Walker, supra note 4, at 540-41.
82. See generally Polikoff, supra note 5.
83. Joint Custody Debate Goes On: What Did the Legislators Mean?, Mo.
Law. Weekly, May 23, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
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If the court considers the value of basic services the custodial parent
provides, including doing laundry, preparing meals, shopping, housekeeping,
and chauffeuring, this provision should pose no real threat to conscientious
custodial parents. 86 Other possible services which could be reported in the
accounting process include sewing, tutoring, interior decorating, gardening,
and bookkeeping 7 Ironically, this accounting provision, should it become
widely ordered, could demonstrate through financial statistics that child
support payments are insufficient to cover all the child's expenses. Such
a revelation could lead to a modification increasing the child support award
in a substantial number of cases, thus producing beneficial results.
Even if the accounting shows that the custodial parent is not exercising
sound judgment concerning the expenditures of child support money, how-
ever, it is doubtful the court would order a reduction of the child support
award. Relying on Sauer v. Newman,88 Missouri courts would likely find
it "manifestly unjust" to allow the noncustodial parent to deprive children
of payments designed for their benefit because of the custodial parent's
financial mismanagement.8 9 More likely remedies include requiring the cus-
todial parent to use money for stipulated expenditures or permitting the
noncustodial parent to pay at least a portion of the support into a trust
fund created for the child's benefit. If these remedies prove inadequate,
then the court could consider transferring custody as a last resort. From
a practical standpoint, the accounting provision may realistically be nothing
more than an exercise in "creative accounting.
'90
VISITATION
In what is considered the most controversial aspect of the legislation, 9'
continued payment of child support is linked to visitation rights. The statute
provides:
6. A court may abate, in whole or in part, any future obligation of
support or may transfer the custody of one or more children if it finds:
(1) That a custodial parent, has without good cause, failed to provide
visitation or temporary custody to the noncustodial parent pursuant to
the terms of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or modifications
86. See Minton, Evaluating the Homemakers Services, DIssoLunoN OF MAR-
IAGE 1981, at 9, 20-23 (1981).
87. See id.
88. 666 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
89. See id. at 815.
90. Mo. Law. Weekly, May 23 at 4, col. 2.
91. One practitioner assessed the provision saying that "Eilt makes absolutely
no sense to punish a child because of a visitation fight between the parents ....
[Payments and visitation] are two separate and individual rights and we have no
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thereof; and
(2) That the noncustodial parent is current in payment of all support
obligations pursuant to the terms of a decree of dissolution, legal separation
or modifications thereof. The court may also award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.-
The general rule is that if one parent is awarded custody of a child,
the other parent receives reasonable visitation rights. 93 Traditionally, states
steadfastly separated the obligation of support and the right to visitation.94
A review of the case law in other jurisdictions suggests that courts usually
condition continued support payments on non-interference with visitation95
in extreme situations; for example, removing the child from the jurisdiction
without prior approval from the court or when there has been "an extended
pattern of total refusal to honor the visitation award." 96 In Richardson v.
Richardson,97 the Michigan Court of Appeals indicated that although that
state's law provides for the suspension of child support payments when
the noncustodial parent's visitation rights are denied wrongfully, the in-
terference must constitute "a course of conduct designed to frustrate ...
visitation rights." 98 Other courts, however, have held that the frustration
of visitation rights, whether due to the custodial parent's interference or
the child's refusal to cooperate, does not warrant withholding child support
payments. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Appert v. Appert"
found the trial court's ruling that support payments be paid into escrow
for any month following a frustrated visitation is "inherently detrimental
to the best interest of the minor child and ... therefore contrary to"
North Carolina's law.10'
The statutory approach to this situation is in flux. For example, in
1978, New York enacted legislation by which a court could "suspend
[alimony or maintenance] payments or cancel any arrears that may have
accrued during the time that visitation rights have been or are being
interfered with or withheld.' 01 In 1986, the legislature added a final
92. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 452.340.6 (1988).
93. M. WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN 54 (1980).
94. G. SILVER & M. SILVER, WEEKEND FATHERS 119 (1986).
95. Visitation interference-which may be minimal or extreme, subtle or
overt-includes refusing to allow an alternative visitation when the child's needs
prevent complying with the agreed upon schedule, portraying the noncustodial
parent in such a manner that the child seeks to avoid the visitation, and actually
hiding the child and refusing to disclose his location. Horowitz & Dodson, Child
Support, Custody and Visitation, in 2 IMPRoVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE 111-92,
111-95 (1986).
96. Id. at III-101.
97. 122 Mich. App. 531, 332 N.W.2d 524 (1983).
98. Id. at 533, 332 N.W.2d at 525.
99. 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).
100. Id. at 40, 341 S.E.2d at 349.
101. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 241 (McKinney 1986).
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sentence: "Nothing in this section shall constitute a defense in any court
to an application to enforce payment of child support or grounds for the
cancellation of arrears for child support."' 2 This revision discourages the
noncustodial parent from exercising self-help where the issue is payment
of child support.
Proponents of the "support conditioned upon visitation" provision
believe that vigorous enforcement of visitation rights is the most effective
means of assuring timely compliance with child support orders. Advocates
of this philosophy perceive that a major reason child support is not paid
is because of the custodial parent's interference with visitation rights.?3
This perception has been challenged.1°4 Data suggests that custodial parents
do not routinely interfere with visitation. In reality, studies show that a
significant percentage of custodial parents want the noncustodial parent to
have greater involvement in their children's lives.'0 5 Another study, designed
to assess the noncustodial parent's view of visitation, revealed that less
than one-seventh of these parents had experienced visitation problems.'°6
Reports from a Texas county which enforces both child support orders
and visitation orders reveal that support complaints outnumber visitation
complaints by a ratio of about eighteen to one.' °7 The reports further show
that custodial parents respond "much more cooperatively" to visitation
requests than noncustodial parents respond to requests for delinquent child
support. 0
Critics of the "conditioning" concept reject it primarily because of the
child's needs for continued economic support and also because of the
likelihood of its increasing administrative burdens on an already overworked
child support enforcement system." 9 Missouri family law experts decry the
provision, saying the section creates a situation the state has attempted to
avoid: "The mother says she's not turning the kids over because the father
isn't paying child support, and the father says that under the law he doesn't
have to pay because he's not getting his visitation rights. And the child
is the one who gets hurt.""' 0
Family law experts think it is likely trial judges will disregard this
provision in that it is doubtful "judges would look favorably on a non-
custodial parent's request to abate child support because of a visitation
dispute.""' In egregious situations, however, judges may feel compelled
102. Id.
103. See G. Sn.Pv. & M. SiLvER, WEEKEND FATHERS 119 (1986).
104. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 111-132.




109. Horowitz & Dodson, supra note 95, at 111-93.
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by legislative mandate to take action. In such situations, courts will find
guidance from visitation interference cases to determine whether good cause
exists for interference.
Good cause may be found where the child's physical or emotional
health is threatened. In re Marriage of P.K.A. and J.E.A." 2 held that a
mother was justified in not following the court-ordered visitation terms
when a child's statements and a psychologist's examination indicated the
child was being sexually abused by the father during unsupervised visita-
tion."' Likewise, in Durbin v. Durbin,14 the court found that the custodial
parent would not be held in contempt for failing to follow visitation orders.
In Durbin, the court found that the request for a postponement was
reasonable because the child was recuperating from surgery." 5
The court refused, however, to find a good faith belief that would
warrant denial of visitation in A.G. v. R.M.D.," 6 despite the mother's
claim that she sincerely believed her daughter was being sexually abused
during visitation." 7 The court distinguished Durbin, noting that Durbin
involved a disease that had not been contemplated by the court when
issuing its original visitation decree." 8 When it granted visitation rights,
the A.G. court was fully aware that the child was likely to experience
stress during communications with her father." 9 Durbin was further dis-
tinguished in that the child's illness had been verified, whereas the alleged
sexual abuse in A.G. was neither substantiated by the Missouri Division
of Family Services nor proven in court.120
In assessing this provision which establishes a relationship between
visitation and child support payments (even if one can make the leap of
faith required to accept the detrimental effect the reduction of support
payments is likely to have on children) there appears to be an inherent
imbalance. The statute offers no counterpart provision that allows a cus-
todial parent to request the elimination or reduction of visitation rights if
the noncustodial parent is delinquent in child support payments and the
custodial parent has consistently and faithfully honored the visitation agree-
ment.
Other jurisdictions have advocated this counterpart concept. Termi-
nation of visitation rights was contemplated in Peterson v. Jason, '2 for
situations where the refusal has been "wilful [sic] and intentional and
112. 725 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
113. Id.
114. 573 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
115. Id. at 148.
116. 730 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).




121. 513 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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detrimental to the welfare of the child so that termination would be in
the child's best interest."'22 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Utah in Rohr
v. Rohr,'" stated that although "mere failure to pay child support, where
the failure is due to an inability to pay" is not sufficient to warrant
termination of visitation rights, "where the noncustodial parent's refusal
to pay child support is contumacious, or willful and intentional, and not
due to an inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or denied, if
the welfare of the child so requires."' 24 A far less restrictive view for
conditioning visitation on payment of court-ordered child support is found
in Burnworth v. Hughes.'" In Burnworth, the Supreme Court of Kansas
held that when the trial court addresses an issue involving custody or
visitation, the court may condition the noncustodial parent's visitation rights
upon payment of child support. 26 Factors to be considered in making the
determination are the noncustodial parent's track record in exercising vis-
itation rights, past and current status of the parties' relationship, and the
ages of the children. 27 The court stated:
[a]lthough there is responsible authority for the view that visitation rights
should not be conditioned upon the payment of child support, based upon
the theory that visitation aids the child's psychological development whereas
support caters to the child's physical needs, we believe that the better
view is to allow a trial court, in its discretion, to condition visitation
rights upon the father's payment of reasonable child support. To do
otherwise would amount to overindulging an irresponsible father in pre-
serving his right of visitation, while refusing to use one of the better
means available to the court to encourage him to discharge his obligation
of support."'
Critics of this approach indicate the rationale for not having such a
provision is the best interests of the child and the strong policy in main-
taining a positive relationship with the noncustodial parent. Yet, if main-
taining open communication and frequent contact is so essential to the
stable development of children, the statute does not contain a provision
providing that a court may take action if the noncustodial parent does
not fulfill his or her duties and responsibilities concerning visitation.
CONCLUSION
It is no easy task for the legislature to take control of matters tra-
ditionally reserved to the family. Practitioners cannot expect the legislature
122. Id. at 1352.
123. 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 1985).
124. Id. at 383.
125. 234 Kan. 69, 670 P.2d 917 (1983).
126. Id. at 75, 670 P.2d at 922.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 75-76, 670 P.2d at 922.
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to anticipate every conceivable problem in an area which the legislature
has only recently begun to regulate. More than likely, further modifications
of this statute will be forthcoming as the legislature grapples with the
difficult and sensitive problems of regulating domestic relations.
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